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Abstract. A new casting of diasporas, exiles and returnees as potentially transformative
agents in post-conﬂict polities is the topic of this article. ‘Return of Qualiﬁed Expatriates’
programmes have recently been launched by international agencies in a number of
post-conﬂict countries in an attempt to promote better capacity-building within post-conﬂict
states institutions. This article argues that the ostensible technical orientation of these
programmes is misleading, and they have a political signiﬁcance which is noted and
contested locally. In political terms, they represent attempts to smuggle Western hierarchies
of knowledge into post-conﬂict reconstruction eﬀorts under the cover of ethnic solidarity, to
the detriment of local participation and empowerment. The article argues further that this
is always contested by interested parties locally, often by mobilising alternative capacities,
labelled ‘authentic’, in opposition. As such, strategies that attempt to use ethnic ties to
overcome this local contestation are placing a signiﬁcant burden on ethnic categories that
are slippery, malleable and contested in post-conﬂict contexts. These points are demon-
strated with reference to the cases of Cambodia and Timor-Leste.
Caroline Hughes is Director of the Asia Research Centre and Associate Professor of
Governance Studies in the School of Social Sciences and Humanities at Murdoch
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The last ﬁfteen years have seen a shift in the nature of international perspectives
on war, and, concomitantly, in beliefs about building states to maintain peace.
Since the early 1990s, popular perspectives on intra-state wars have privileged
explanations rooted in essentialist ideas about ethnicity
1 and an assumed propen-
sity of ethnic groups to vie violently with one another for access to money and
power. In a range of post-war countries, from the Balkans to Rwanda, Iraq and
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1493Afghanistan, this ethnicised view of war carried over into an ethnicised view of
peace also: a view of peace in which stability is achieved initially by the engineering
of institutions to create particular ethnic balances; and in which stability subse-
quently gives way to ‘good governance’ via a process of capacity building designed
to help those institutions over the longer term to elevate themselves above the ethnic
fray. Heavily inﬂuenced by the literature on democratic transition and consolida-
tion, peace is regarded as a function of the ability of well-designed institutions to
constrain social action.
2
Such a conceptualisation of trajectories towards peace thus posits a form of state
that is both embedded in ethnic relations, and able to govern them. This form of
ethnicised ‘embedded autonomy’, to borrow Peter Evans’ term,
3 is frequently
framed in the idea of ‘capacity-building’ as a suitable hybrid of local and Western
knowledges. Capacity-building elicits both the internalisation of Western knowl-
edges by non-Western professionals, and at the same time, the exercise of ‘local
ownership’ over these. In this article, I explore this approach initially through a
discussion of the status of diasporas in Western thinking about war, peace and
development over the last ﬁfteen years, and the shift from regarding exile commu-
nities as dangerous hotbeds of long-distance nationalism to valuable sources of both
funds and expertise. However, analysis of the progress of returned exiles seeking to
build capacities and/or join the political fray in two case studies, Cambodia and
Timor-Leste, suggests that the question of local knowledge and problem-solving
Western knowhow is open to contestation, and that therefore, where statebuilding
is concerned, there is no substitute for old-fashioned politics.
Intra-state war in international policy
As the Cold War wound down and then abruptly ended, aspirations for a world
without war took the form of the assertion that war was, in eﬀect, irrational and
unnecessary, now that liberal ideology was in the ascendant. Consequently, new
institutions, and preferably liberal democratic ones, were required to deal swiftly
and fairly with conﬂict wherever it should arise, and prevent it where it appeared
imminent.
4
2 See, for example, Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild’s characterisation of the problem in their,
Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, 15 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2005), p. 2; Roeder and Rothchild use concepts of institutional ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’ drawn
from the work of democratic transition theorists such as Larry Diamond, Philippe Schmitter and
Adam Przeworski. See also the inﬂuential scholarly and policy work of Benjamin Reilly on
institutional design, especially his Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conﬂict
Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
3 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995).
4 See, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Democracy: A Newly Recognised Imperative’, Global
Governance, 1 (1995), p. 3; also the revival of the democratic peace thesis, following Michael Doyle,
‘Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), pp. 1151–63; see, for
example, Daniele Archibugi, ‘Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace’, European Journal of
International Relations (1995), pp. 429–56; Bruce Russett, Christopher Layne, David Spiro and
Michael Doyle, ‘Correspondance: the Democratic Peace Thesis’, International Security, 19:4 (1995),
pp. 164–84; Stanley Hoﬀman, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, Foreign Policy, 98 (1995),
pp. 159–77.
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the dramatic failure of a number of peace processes, most prominently Angola and
Rwanda, which attempted to use power-sharing and elections to end warfare; the
communal violence accompanying the transition to electoralism in the Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia; and the democratic election of Islamist parties in North
Africa and the Middle East. Subsequently, greater attention was paid to ethnicity
as an explanatory factor in the rise of the ‘new wars’. A variety of diﬀerent
approaches to the study of ethnic conﬂict emerged. At one end of the spectrum
were crudely primordialist prophecies of doom, as exempliﬁed by Robert Kaplan’s
article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled ‘The Coming Anarchy’.
5 This piece
launched the ‘New Barbarism’ thesis by claiming that social breakdown in parts of
Africa was caused by the inability of inferior cultural forms – communalism,
animism, and the extended family are speciﬁcally mentioned – to cope with
environmental crisis and globalisation. The New Barbarism was a logically
incoherent but politically inﬂuential dogma, which, according to Stephen Ellis, was
distributed as important reading matter by the US State Department to US
embassies around the world.
6
More interestingly, the importance of globalisation in determining the nature of
the New Wars was advanced by Mary Kaldor; Kaldor drew the connection in her
book between proliferating transnational connections and the rise of ethnicity as a
factor in conﬂict.
7 The decline of superpower funding for wars in underdeveloped
countries in the South prompted greater analytical interest in the involvement of
diaspora communities in funding and mobilising support for internal conﬂict in
various countries around the world. The signiﬁcance of the Croatian community in
various European countries during the Balkan Wars and the mobilisation of the
Tamil community in Britain to support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s
separatist struggle in the north of Sri Lanka have been extensively studied in this
literature.
8 This kind of diaspora ﬁnancing for war was not a new phenomenon:
the Irish Republican Army’s struggle for Irish reuniﬁcation had long been
supported ﬁnancially by Irish communities in the US, while the inﬂuence of the
Jewish and Palestinian diasporas on politics in the Middle East was also profound.
However, once superpower rivalries and funding receded in importance over the
course of the 1990s, this ethnic dimension to conﬂict stood out more clearly, and
was regarded as growing in importance as a result of technical advances in media
and telecommunications.
5 Robert Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism and
Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet’, The Atlantic Monthly (February
1994), available at: {http://www.theatlantic.com/} accessed on 17 September 2007.
6 Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an
African Civil War (London: Hurst, 1999), pp. 19–20.
7 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, Organised Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
8 See Benedict Anderson, ‘Long-Distance Nationalism’, New Left Review; Khachig Tololyan,
‘Rethinking Diasporas: Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment’, Diaspora: a Journal of
Transnational Studies, 5:1 (1996), pp. 3–36; Zlatko Skrbis, Long Distance Nationalism: Diasporas,
Homelands and Identities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeﬄer, Greed and
Grievance in Civil War (Washington: World Bank, 2000); Yossi Shain, ‘The Role of Diasporas in
Conﬂict Perpetuation or Resolution’, SAIS Review, 22:2 (2002), p. 116; Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid
Khoser (eds), New Approaches to Migration: Transnational Communities and the Transformation of
Home (London: Routledge, 2002).
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upsurge of violence-from-below, as were refugees, now viewed unsympathetically,
particularly following the moral dilemmas posed by Hutu refugee camps in Zaire,
as a threat to the health, security, and prosperity of the Western world.
The analytical purchase of Kaldor’s ‘new wars’ model was soon subsumed
under rhetorical concerns regarding the dysfunctionality of whole nations or ethnic
groups engaged in intra-state war. Furthermore, links between ‘there’ and ‘here’ in
a globalising world prompted the emergence of concerns about ‘failed states’ –
states that failed due their own incompetence to retain legitimacy and police their
populations, and which therefore not only fell into civil strife at home, but caused
security problems for their neighbours and internationally.
9
In the emerging policy debate about what to do about states in conﬂict, a
growing preference became evident among international organisations for long
term engagements aimed, not merely at achieving a ceaseﬁre, but at ‘building
peace’ and reconstructing economies, through the promotion of particular types of
governance that could better manage unruly societies. A key World Bank report
published in 1998 gave an account of intra-state war as characterised by ‘cultures
of armed warfare and violence’
10 which feed on, and exacerbate ‘ethnic or religious
competition’, encouraging a view of conﬂict as increasingly an endemic condition.
A cycle of violence emerges which is embedded in a local context, and which
increases in its complexity with every round, entailing that ‘there is no pattern or
single causal agent in any given case, and outside actors have only a limited ability
to inﬂuence the course of events in speciﬁc countries.’
11
Paul Collier’s research for the Bank on the causes and consequences of
intra-state war subsequently reﬁned this thesis. Collier argued that economics was
the most important factor in sparking conﬂict, linking ‘the disastrous deviation of
African economic performance from that of other developing countries’ to the level
of conﬂict in the continent. He and his team identiﬁed the statistical signiﬁcance
of the presence of lootable natural resources in starting wars, leading to the ‘greed
thesis’. This speciﬁcally rejected the idea of wars and insurgencies emerging from
grievance over injustice or oppression. Collier attributed war primarily to the
‘lure of imagined wealth’ for political leaders and the ignorance and easy
manipulability of their followers. At the same time, Collier’s team also noted that
certain types of ethnic mix were particularly conﬂict-prone, asserting that the
presence of one ethnic group comprising between 45 per cent and 80 per cent of
the population doubled the risk of conﬂict. Further, they noted that countries
which acquired an exile diaspora in North America during the course of a conﬂict
were six times more likely to fall back into conﬂict after eﬀorts to make peace.
12
In Collier’s work in line with wider thinking about the causes and consequences of
conﬂict in the mid to late 1990s, diasporas and refugees are viewed as dangerous
9 See Gerald Helman and Stephen Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States’, Foreign Policy, 89 (1992/1993),
pp. 3–20; and the reassessment following 11 September 2001 as in Robert Rotberg, ‘Failed States
in a World of Terror’, Foreign Aﬀairs, 81:4 (2002), pp. 127–40.
10 World Bank, Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction, the Role of the World Bank (Washington DC: World
Bank, 1998), p. 2.
11 World Bank, Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction,p .1 7 .
12 Betty Bigombe, Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Policies for Building Post-Conﬂict Peace’,
Journal of African Economies, 9:3 (2000), pp. 323–48.
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to reclaim lost territories for the homeland, but who are secretly stashing away
billions of dollars worth of lootable natural resources in the bank.
13
By the 21st century, however, this ordering had shifted again. The War on
Terror demanded a return to a system-wide war footing. To an extent, the UN was
marginalised, and the US emerged as the sole superpower to the fore in
international politics, under the scanty ﬁg leaf of the unappealing Coalition of the
Willing. The military objective in the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq was the
imposition of friendly regimes over unruly populations in strategic areas; as such,
diasporas were recast again, not as the irredeemably nostalgic sponsors of ethnic war,
but as sharply divided between, on the one hand, threats to homeland security, to be
dealt by swift and terrible means; but, on the other, as potentially reliable allies in
an ethnicised peace.
14
This coincided with a new analysis of the signiﬁcance of migrants for
international policy in the merging ﬁelds of security and development. New
approaches to measuring remittance ﬂows revealed these to be far more extensive
than development professionals had realised, leading to a rapid reassessment of
policy priorities and the rise of a new ‘development mantra’.
15 Similarly, greater
attention to the increasing tendency to circular migration between countries like
India and the US prompted interest in the phenomenon of ‘brain gain’ – the return
of highly skilled professionals with signiﬁcant international experience to raise the
technical level of industries back home.
16 New excitement and considerable policy
activity on the part of international organisations over this ethnicised version of
international development led to a reassessment of how refugee or exile commu-
nities might engage with their homelands. The World Bank produced a study in
2006 entitled Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills: How
Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad.
17 Equally, a new role for diasporas
as enlightened contributors to post-conﬂict reconstruction, rather than as atavistic
sponsors of conﬂict, was envisaged in the context of countries emerging from the
wars of the 1990s. A project has been initiated to research this at the University
13 The model for this is former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who supported rebels in Sierra
Leone and fomented ethnic conﬂict in Liberia in the name of Greater Liberia, in the course of which
he managed to enrich himself by several billion dollars through led an invasion of Sierra Leone in
the name of Greater Liberia, in the course of which he managed to enrich himself by several billion
dollars through trading arms for diamonds.
14 See Simon Chesterman’s account of the change in UN attitudes towards ethnic division between its
deployment to Kosovo in 1999 and its deployment to Afghanistan in 2002. Chesterman, You the
People: the UN, Transitional Administration and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004).
15 Devesh Kapur, ‘Remittances: The New Development Mantra?’, Paper presented at the G-24
Technical Group Meeting, Harvard University and Center for Global Development (2003).
16 See Jean-Baptiste Meyer, Jorge Charum, Dora Bernal, Jacques Gaillard, José Granés, John Leon,
Alvaro Montenegro, Alvaro Morales, Carlos Murcia, Nora Narvaez-Berthelemot Luz Stella
Parrado, Bernard Schlemmer, ‘Turning Brain Drain into Brain Gain: The Colombia Experience of
the Diaspora Option’, Science, Technology and Society, 2:2 (1997), pp. 285–315; Uwe Hunger,
‘Indian IT Entrepreneurs in the US and in India: An Illustration of the “Brain Gain Hypothesis”’,
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 6:2 (2004), pp. 99–109; Anna Lee
Saxenian, ‘From Brain Drain to Brain Circulation: Transnational Communities and Regional
Upgrading in India and China’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 40:2 (2005),
pp. 35–61.
17 Yevgeny Kuznetsov, Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills: How Countries
Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad (Washington DC: World Bank Institute: 2006).
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18 a publication produced by the UN
University in 2007 sought to address the question of ‘how to channel the positive
contributions of diasporas so as to support conﬂict resolution’.
19 This was a shift
which coordinated fortunately with a newly acquired interest on the part of the US
in placing US-grown client regimes in power in various countries it had recently
invaded as part of the War on Terror.
One of the contributors to the UNU study categorised potential contributions
of returnees from developed countries into political, economic and socio-cultural
spheres. Alongside the economic impact of aid and remittances, potential political
contributions identiﬁed included strengthening civil society and promoting demo-
cracy. Jacob Bercovitch, in his contribution to the volume, wrote that ‘Diasporas
can make an important contribution to the development of a healthy and vibrant
civil society in the wake of a conﬂict.’ He continued, ‘Diasporas in democratic
countries can inform members of their group in the homeland of the norms, values
and institutions which deﬁne a democratic polity and which provide equal rights
to all.’
20 Similarly, in the sphere of socio-cultural inﬂuence, he suggested that
diasporas should have a role to play in promoting justice and reconciliation. He
noted:
Reconciliation is the means to heal people and rebuild webs of relationships, which have
been broken down by years of hatred and violence. When it comes to reconciliation, people
in the homeland are more accepting and willing to listen to advice from members of the
diaspora rather than other foreigners. Members of the diaspora can oﬀer expertise,
knowledge and understanding of cultural norms and a deeper appreciation of the situation
in their homeland.
21
In response to this new policy agenda, the International Organisation for
Migration began to run ‘Return of Qualiﬁed Nationals’ programmes in countries
like Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as across Africa. The Afghan
programme was designed to ‘ﬁll short-term capacity gaps’ in Afghan ministries by
placing highly qualiﬁed and highly paid expatriate Afghans from developed
countries into key advisory positions, with a mandate to train colleagues.
22
This new casting of diasporas, exiles and returnees as potentially transformative
agents in post-conﬂict polities is the object of scrutiny in this article. On the one
hand, this rhetoric closely resembles the kinds of things that returnees from
developed countries say about themselves when they return to their war-torn
homeland. And it is certainly the case that many exiles are eager to return to their
country of origin and help, if they can. On the other, the evidence supporting their
ability to eﬀect these kinds of changes is slender. Three problems present
themselves. First, the extent to which any individual can be transformative in such
a context is questionable. Ideas about capacity development which assume that
18 The Project is one of three key topics addressed by the Transformation of War Economies Project;
for details see: {http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/twe/research/#diasporas} accessed on 26 August 2009.
19 Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, ‘Preface’, in Smith and Stares (eds), Diasporas in Conﬂict: Peace-
Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2007), p. viii.
20 Jacob Bercovitch, ‘Diasporas and Conﬂict Resolution’, in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (eds),
Diasporas in Conﬂict: Peacemakers or Peace-wreckers? (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2007), p. 34.
21 Bercovitch, ‘Diasporas and Conﬂict Resolution’, p. 35.
22 Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, Capacity Development Secre-
tariat, ‘Afghan Expatriate Program’, webpage, available at: {http://www.afghanexperts.gov.af/index.
php?page_id=17} accessed on 20 August 2009.
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individual to another have been widely critiqued recently by political economists
arguing for a theory of institutional change that is rooted in the transformation of
societal forces as a causal factor, rather than in a mere technical process of
upgrading.
23
An evaluation of a 2007 EU funded Return of Qualiﬁed Afghans programme
Afghanistan oﬀers a good example of the kinds of problems inherent in the latter
conception of returnees. The evaluation stated that the objective of the programme
was ‘to enhance the capacities for policy and institutional reform through the
placement of approximately 22 Afghan expatriates with signiﬁcant reconstruction
and development experience to enhance the government’s eﬀectiveness in oversee-
ing urgent policy and institutional reforms.’
24 Describing the challenges facing the
expatriate experts, the evaluation report noted ‘lack of facilities and proper
working environment’; bureaucratic centralisation and consequent resistance to
change on the part of the government; ‘discrimination’ against the experts because
of the disparity between their salaries and those of ordinary civil servants; and ‘low
capacity of the team the experts are working with’.
25 From a merely technical
perspective, it could be objected that these kinds of problems are precisely the
point and that is why capacity building is needed. But it is more signiﬁcant,
perhaps, to note that the make-up of the local team, its access to facilities and
resources, the sentiments emerging over disparities in pay, and the attitude of the
government to change are not merely technical problems to be overcome by
capacity building, but the result of political decisions, about staﬃng, funding and
reform. Capacity builders are not merely imparting knowledge, but intervening
politically.
Second, the new enthusiasm on the part of international aid agencies for the
prospects of getting returnees from previously exiled communities to deliver aid in
an ‘ethnically appropriate’ way is based upon dubious premises regarding ethnic
solidarity. Commonalities of language – certainly one aspect of ethnicity – may
certainly oﬀer advantages to individuals working in the ﬁeld of public admin-
istration reform, although this does not appear to have been much of an issue in
the context of Afghanistan: the Afghan Government’s Resource Guide for
prospective returnees gives the following curiously nonchalant guidance on the
language question:
Within the Afghan government itself, English is a highly sought after language skill.
However, at times, proﬁcient spoken and even written, Dari & Pashto are also necessary.
26
23 See Richard Robison, ‘Strange Bedfellows: Political Alliances in the Making of Neo-Liberal
Governance’, in Robison and Wil Hout (eds), Governance and the Depoliticisation of Development,
(London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 15–28.
24 Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission Capacity Development Secre-
tariat, Program Support Unit Monitoring and Evaluation Section, ‘Placement of Afghan Expatriate
Professionals from EU Countries: Experts’ Performance Evaluation Report’ (Kabul: IARCSC,
2008), p. 3.
25 ‘Evaluation Report’, p. 6.
26 Embassy of Afghanistan, Return of Qualiﬁed Expatriates Resource Guide (Washington: Embassy of
Afghanistan, 2006), p. 17, available at: {http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/documents/
ExpatPacket11–2-06.pdf} accessed on 23 February 2009.
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tions in the Iraq war,
27 and as I will show in the discussion below of returnees in
two other post-conﬂict countries, Cambodia and East Timor, commonalities of
‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ cannot be assumed, due to the diﬀerent
transformations forged both between and among homeland and diaspora popula-
tions as a result of diﬀerent experiences of war and exile. Where it is politically
expedient to challenge assertions of ethnic identity, it is actually very easy to
challenge them.
Third, in the context of the Afghan Expatriate Return scheme, the distance
between expatriate returnees and locals was not only evident from past experiences,
but was speciﬁcally codiﬁed in the terms of the scheme itself. Thus, the Afghan
government’s resource guide states that, for the more senior positions in the
Afghan scheme, ‘depending on educational level and work experience, one may be
recruited as either an “international” or “local” staﬀ which would, of course,
impact salaries.’
28 A UNDP report on the scheme noted that, perhaps predictably,
where ‘international’ salaries were awarded, ‘the provision of Afghan expertise to
line ministries at daily fee rates that represent multiples of monthly salaries of civil
servants has raised sensitive questions and is partially responsible for the delays
and political resistance in [. . .] implementation.’
29
The payment of international salaries represents an evident, material discrimi-
nation which loads a great deal of pressure onto presumed ethnic bonds.
Furthermore, the technical solutions and professional expertise that returned
qualiﬁed expatriates are envisaged to bring to their country of origin create a new
metric for discriminating between the relative worth of diﬀerent contributors to
national reconstruction: those who possess Western ‘solutions’ and those who
possess only Afghan ‘problems’. This is not to say that expertise is no use in a
post-conﬂict setting: but it is to recognise the political signiﬁcance of introducing
Western forms of knowledge as key resources, since doing so creates new hierarchies
of contribution and exclusion from the business of reconstructing the country.
The expectation that some kind of ethnic camaraderie can somehow counteract
this politics, and render it a harmless internal aﬀair, loads a great deal of pressure
onto presumed ethnic bonds. This is not only the case in the highly politicised area
of public administration reform, but also in the wider, and equally politicised ﬁelds
of democracy promotion, civil society activism and reconciliation. The assumption
that returnees will be recognised as ‘sisters and brothers’, as Bercovitch describes
them, whose advice is valued and acted upon, is arguably far-fetched, and based
upon an idealistic conception of what ethnicity might be made to achieve. In my
analysis of two cases, Cambodia and Timor-Leste, below, I suggest that in the
politics of status, hierarchy and knowledge surrounding the role of returnees from
the diaspora, there is far too much at stake in terms of distributions of power in the
post-conﬂict era for feelings of ethnic solidarity to simply override political struggle
27 Denise Natali, ‘Kurdish Interventions in the Iraq War’, in Smith and Stares (eds), Diasporas in
Conﬂict,p .1 9 8 .
28 Embassy of Afghanistan, Return of Qualiﬁed Expatriates Resource Guide,p .1 6 .
29 Stephen Massing and Abdul Bari, ‘Capacity Development During Political Transitions: the Case of
Afghanistan’, paper presented at the Seminar on Capacity Development, Bratislava (21–23
November 2005).
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exclusionary lines in the interest of supporting local claims to knowledge and
power.
The ethnic politics of capacity building
Attempts to recruit ethnic kin as capacity builders can be regarded as reﬂecting,
not merely the language diﬃculties that beguile post-conﬂict aid operations, but as
an attempt to mask the highly ideological nature of capacity-building discourses
themselves, in a context of aid-dependent development. The term ‘capacity-
building’ as it is used today comes from two diﬀerent conceptions that appear in
the literature on post-conﬂict reconstruction – that associated with participatory
approaches to community development and that associated with second-generation
state reforms – the so-called ‘post-conditionality’ era of donor-state relations. In
the former, associated with Deborah Eade’s formulation from 1997, the ‘capacities’
to be built are contextual, and focused on overcoming external constraints. She
writes:
A capacity-building approach to development involves identifying the constraints that
women and men experience in realizing their basic rights, and ﬁnding appropriate vehicles
through which to strengthen their ability to overcome their causes of exclusion and
suﬀering.
30
In this formulation, external agents operate to try to develop and systematise
already existing capacities within communities, as a means to put ‘development’ on
a sustainable local footing.
In the context of state-building, by contrast, ‘capacity’-building has been
focused on the reform of institutions to better conform to the rational-legal and,
speciﬁcally, neoliberal ideal, as explicated by the new institutionalist economics and
reiterated by Francis Fukuyama in his recent book on the subject. Fukuyama
deﬁnes ‘capacity’ in this context as ‘the ability of states to plan and execute policies
and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently’
31 – a formulation that closely
conforms to World Bank deﬁnitions of good governance. Indeed, Fukuyama cites
the World Bank’s 1997 report on the state, and its catalogue of state functions
ranging from ‘minimal’ to ‘activist’. As Shahar Hameiri has noted, in this
approach, capacity building serves the purpose of not merely rebuilding the state,
but of signiﬁcantly reorienting it towards international agendas and is thus ‘in
reality a political project’ one ‘with identiﬁable political and ideological underpin-
nings that attempts to establish a certain relationship between rulers and ruled.’
Furthermore, he argues, this project can only be understood ‘against the backdrop
of the development of technocratic modes of governance within a neoliberalising
Western state.’
32 The distinction between Eade’s and Fukuyama’s approach to
capacity in these two contexts is signiﬁcant. In the former case, the nature of the
30 Deborah Eade, Capacity-Building: an Approach to People-Centred Development (Oxford: Oxfam,
1997), p. 24.
31 Francis Fukuyama, State Building, Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century
(London: Proﬁle Books, 2004), p. 9.
32 Shahar Hameiri, ‘Capacity and Its Fallacies: International State Building as State Transformation’,
Millennium, 38:1 (2009), p. 57.
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external actors. In the latter, the ‘capacities’ are Western ideologies, to be imparted
and determined by outsiders as a means to achieve political outcomes.
A further issue in deﬁning capacity building is the extent to which the term is
associated with ‘empowerment’. As Van Der Borgh points out, while ‘most’
external donors claim to strengthen local capacities in some way, ‘some focus
exclusively on the strengthening of local capacities as an end in itself; others treat
it as a means to build civil society and to deepen the democratic process.’
33 Both
capacity building through reform of the state and capacity building through the
‘empowerment’ of civil society address the idea of good governance, from the
supply- and demand-sides.
A growing body of literature has criticised the use of ‘empowerment’ in this
context as a form of newspeak. Oliver Richmond comments that, in post-conﬂict
states undergoing international intervention, ‘Guidance in, or control of, almost
every aspect of state and society is provided by external actors, which construct
liberal regimes through a mixture of consensual and punitive strategies.’
34 As such,
the liberal peace is transformed from a liberating ideal to a top-down, exclusionary
and hegemonic aﬀair, with respect to both state and civil society. John Pender
comments, with reference to Tanzania: ‘Despite the appearance of two distinct,
complementary and countervailing spheres of Tanzanian politics – civil society and
pro-reform state elite – these two spheres are both separate wings of international
inﬂuence in Tanzania, playing out a peculiar shadow theatre for the beneﬁt of
donors.’
35 The empowerment oﬀered by this kind of intervention is merely a
cipher.
The ambition of liberal peacebuilders, with their desire to achieve such
‘empowerment’ not merely at the level of the conﬂict-ridden state, but at the level
of the individual within the war-torn society, arguably creates the need for
capacity-building on a lavish scale in post-conﬂict states. Capacity building thus
comes to represent the means by which individuals are brought to a consciousness of
the appropriate, internationally mandated and administered, routes to peace.I t
represents the training of individuals as a means to reconstruct their relationships
with one another, and with international agencies themselves – as a means to
empowerment through the disciplining of political contention into ‘standards of
“proper” behaviour’.
36
But in fact, in my exploration of this below in the context of East Timor and
Cambodia, I challenge Pender’s claim that the new conditionality reduces politics
33 Chris Van Der Borgh, ‘Donors in War-Torn Societies: El Salvador’, in Gerd Junne and Willemijn
Verkoren (eds), Post-Conﬂict Development, Meeting New Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005),
p. 249.
34 Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), p. 104. Richmond’s
work on post-conﬂict peacebuilding has echoes in the growing ‘governmentality’ literature on
governance reforms in the context of development; see, for example, Jeremy Gould, ‘Poverty, Politics
and States of Partnership’, in Gould (ed.), The New Conditionality: the Politics of Poverty Reduction
Strategies, (London: Zed, 2005), pp. 1–16; and Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve:
Governmentality, Development and the Practice of Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).
35 John Pender, ‘Country Ownership: the Evasion of Donor Responsibility’, in Christopher Bickerton
et al., (eds), Politics Without Sovereignty, a Critique of Contemporary International Relations
(London: University College London Press, 2007), p. 123.
36 Jeremy Gould and Julia Ojanen, ‘Tanzania: Merging in the Circle’, in Gould (ed.), The New
Conditionality, the Politics of Poverty Reduction Strategies (London: Zed, 2005), p. 45.
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of ‘capacity’ has been translated into local political discourse with real eﬀects on
the ground, although not necessarily those envisaged by capacity builders
themselves. This not only aﬀects who gets what why and how in post-conﬂict states,
but also aﬀects the conception of the political community and the status of the state
that represents and governs it.
These real eﬀects have been almost uniformly underestimated and/or misread
by international actors, who are regularly unduly swayed in their assessments of
post-conﬂict contexts by the terra nullius discourses that inform state-building
eﬀorts in post-conﬂict societies. This is a powerful idea that has underwritten and
legitimised many statebuilding eﬀorts. It takes slightly diﬀerent forms in diﬀerent
places – in East Timor, the claim that the departure of the Indonesians had left
Timor entirely bereft of experienced personnel informed much decision-making by
the UN Transitional Authority; while in Cambodia, reiteration of the extermina-
tion of the educated class under the Pol Pot regime of the 1970s permitted similar
assumptions, despite the fact that a state had been rebuilt during the 1980s by
administrators and technicians trained in Vietnam and the Soviet Bloc. In the
case of Cambodia, this was combined with the idea that the entire nation had
been ‘traumatized’ and ‘brutalized’ by war, an idea that contributed to the
delegitimation of local eﬀorts and the legitimation of international ones.
37
On the back of these assumptions international intervenors are able to
articulate grand visions, free of the constraints of local politics. In Cambodia, the
SRSG wrote that the task of UNTAC was ‘to build a new country’
38 while a
diﬀerent SRSG in East Timor enthused, ‘we are faced with the almost unprec-
edented opportunity to get a country right from the beginning.’
39 It is signiﬁcant
that there is a substantial literature now criticising UNTAET’s highly centralised
mode of operation and its reluctance to cede greater participation to East
Timorese; there is also a rather smaller literature which criticises the failure of
UNTAC to recognise the realities of the existing state in Cambodia in the early
1990s.
40 However, much of this literature places the blame on short-sighted actors
or tendencies embedded in the structures of international institutions. Such
37 See Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac, ‘The Pathologization of Post-Conﬂict Societies:
Cambodia and Kosovo Compared’, Third World Quarterly, 26:6 (2005), pp. 873–89.
38 Akashi, Yasushi, ‘To Build a New Country, the Task of the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia’, Harvard International Review (1992/1993), pp. 34–5, 68–9.
39 Sergio Vieira de Mello, Statement. Lisbon Donors’ Meeting on East Timor (22–23 June 2000),
available at: {http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTIMORLESTE/Resources/Opening+Sergio.pdf}
accessed on 22 May 2008.
40 The situation in the two countries is compared in Caroline Hughes, Dependent Communities: Aid and
Politics in Cambodia and East Timor (Ithaca: Cornell SEAP, 2009); on East Timor, see Astrid
Surkhe, ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders, Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor’, International
Peacekeeping, 8:4 (2001), pp. 1–20; Jarat Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor’, Survival, 42:3
(2000), pp. 27–39 and ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, Development and Change, 33:5 (2002),
pp. 979–1000; Simon Chesterman, ‘Peacekeeping in Transition: Self-Determination, Statebuilding
and the UN’, International Peacekeeping, 9:1 (2002), pp. 45–76. On Cambodia see Caroline Hughes,
The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991–2001 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003);
Andrew Robert Cock, ‘The Interaction between a Ruling Elite and an Externally Promoted
Policy Reform Agenda: The Case of Forestry under the Second Kingdom of Cambodia 1993–
2003’, PhD Dissertation, La Trobe University (2007); Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks, ‘Liberal
Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia’, Security Dialogue, 38:1 (2007), pp. 27–48; Beatrice Pouligny,
Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Peacekeepers and Local People (London: Hurst and Co,
2006).
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intervention in the ﬁrst place, and they also have the function of permitting a form
of ‘capacity building’ which dispenses with the imperative, articulated in the
progressive, community-development oriented conception of the term as developed
by Eade, of analysing people’s existing capacities in order to help them to use these
to author their own development. In a terra nullius, there are no ‘capacities’ –
just traumatised survivors whose lack of capacity can be used to explain their
failure to respond as desired by international intervenors. Telling in this regard is
the response of an international UNTAET oﬃcial, quoted in The Australian
newspaper, to a strike by local Timorese UNTAET employees. The employees
were striking over pay and conditions; the international oﬃcial commented
that their dissatisfaction was due to their lack of capacity to perform their allotted
roles:
The Timorese have no familiarity with any of these roles. All that experience left with the
Indonesians. We, the donors and the international agencies, are having to train them
virtually from zero.
41
Arguably, this ‘lack of capacity’ diagnosis is signiﬁcant in that it frees international
intervenors from the need to regard local reactions as any kind of a check on their
policies. Yet doing so also blinds intervenors from recognising the ways in which
capacity-building passes into local political discourse with real eﬀects on distributions
of power.
The cases of Cambodia and Timor-Leste exemplify the impact of ideas about
capacities on the organisation of politics in post-conﬂict countries. In both cases,
international intervenors entering the countries after long years of isolation and
destructive warfare found local populations whom they saw as ‘lacking capacity’.
In each case, also, post-conﬂict reconstruction was conducted with a signiﬁcant
degree of participation from returnees from abroad – indeed, founding elections in
both Cambodia and Timor-Leste brought returnees to power, in the shape of
Prince Norodom Ranariddh of the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge
Independent, Neutre, Paciﬁque et Cooperatif (Funcinpec); and Mari Alkatiri of the
Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin). In Cambodia, fur-
thermore, international support for ‘civil society development’ in the early 1990s
led to the emergence of a signiﬁcant NGO sector, which initially was dominated
by returnees. In both Cambodia and Timor-Leste, these returnees relied heavily
upon a political rhetoric in which they equated their own cosmopolitanism with an
ability to both deliver international assistance and control it in the interests of the
nation. Yet in both cases, this rhetoric was successfully challenged with a
counter-rhetoric of ‘authenticity’, in which putatively ‘local’ knowledges of various
kinds were vigorously defended. And in both cases, links with international backers
proved less signiﬁcant at home than the ability to link with and mobilise networks
of real political supporters on the ground.
41 Peter Alford, ‘Peacing East Timor Back Together: Rebuilding East Timor is Proving a Thankless
Task’, The Australian (27 June 2000), reproduced online at: {www.etan.org/et2000b/june/25–30/
27theaus.htm}.
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In East Timor, the Acting Principal Legal Adviser to UNTAET from October 1999
to February 2000, Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, wrote that ‘it quickly became apparent
to UNTAET oﬃcials that a system of justice in East Timor, including the
necessary regulatory framework, ﬁrst had to be built – and built within the shortest
possible time – before it could be administered in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 1272 (1999). Never before has the UN been required to construct,
literally from the ground up, a fully functioning court system, vested with full
criminal and civil jurisdiction [. . .]’.
42 Strohmeyer goes on to describe the physical
destruction of the courtrooms and the lack of experience of the available
appointments to judicial and prosecutorial positions.
While this picture is accurate, it should also be noted that the Indonesians left
behind almost 100 young people with law degrees – a reasonable number to work
with in a country with less than a million inhabitants – and a body of Indonesian
law. When UNTAET discovered this, it took what Strohmeyer describes as the
‘bold but, in light of the circumstances, appropriate step’ of appointing them to
staﬀ the judicial system, while at the same time insisting that the lack of experi-
ence of the appointees necessitated ongoing training and mentoring eﬀorts by
international agencies.
43
In the years that followed, this ‘bold step’ was reversed, as the ‘lack of capacity’
of the Indonesian-trained lawyers and judges was used by the Timorese government
to delegitimise the role of the judiciary after independence. This led to public
disputes conducted via the media between the Indonesian-trained lawyers, now
formed into a Bar Association, and government ministers, including the Prime
Minister himself. The executive began to publicly ignore decisions of the courts on
the grounds that the judges ‘lacked capacity’ and had made the wrong decision; in
response, lawyers held public demonstrations in defence of judicial independence.
Subsequently, in early 2005, the government, via the president of the Court of
Appeal, Claudio Ximenes, imposed a written examination on all judges and
prosecutors to test their ‘capacity’. Every one failed, prompting the government to
suspend them from oﬃcial duties, pending their successful completion of a two and
a half year training programme.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these events caused signiﬁcant discontent among the
legal and judicial profession. Conﬂict between lawyers and judges on the one hand,
and the executive and its man in the judicial sector, Claudio Ximenes, quickly
became linked, by those involved, to questions of status derived from the
experience of resistance to Indonesian rule. The lawyers, all of whom had
graduated from Indonesian universities during the period of occupation, repre-
sented a young generation of Timorese, many of whom had been active, as
students, in the clandestine movement, taking considerable risks to organise public
protests and demonstrations against Indonesian rule. The clandestine movement
had been created in the early 1980s, initially as a means of mobilising support for
the increasingly beleaguered FALINTIL guerrillas hiding in the mountains of
42 Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, ‘Building a New Judiciary for East Timor: Challenges of a Fledgeling
Nation’, Criminal Law Forum, 11 (2000), p. 262.
43 Strohmeyer, ‘Building a New Judiciary’, p. 262.
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the 1980s to international visitors and, occasionally, the international media, the
clandestine movement gained international prominence, particularly after the Santa
Cruz massacre of 1991, in which the killing of hundreds of protestors in a cemetery
in Dili was captured on ﬁlm, smuggled out of Timor, and shown in news bulletins
world wide. The Santa Cruz massacre represented a turning point for the Timorese
resistance, coinciding, as it did, almost exactly with the fall of the Soviet Union,
the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of calls for the international
community to achieve a moral compass by which to steer. Throughout the 1990s,
the clandestine movement in Timor continued to remind the outside world of
Timor’s suﬀering, at great risk to the students and other urban dwellers involved.
By contrast, the executive, and particularly individuals such as the Prime
Minister, Mari Alkatiri, Minister of Justice, Ana Pessoa, and president of the
Supreme Court Claudio Ximenes, was dominated by veterans of the diplomatic
oﬀensive – founding members of FRETILIN who had spent the period of
occupation outside Timor, in Portugal or in other Portuguese speaking countries,
pursuing the largely thankless task of attempting to promote diplomatic interest in
Timor’s plight. This group returned to lead FRETILIN in the post-conﬂict period,
taking command of the political party just as international agencies were seeking
to ‘maximise the use of East Timorese human resources’ and at the same time
promote multi-party democracy. Mari Alkatiri and Ana Pessoa, both of whom
spent the war in Mozambique, along with Ramos-Horta and Joao Carrascalao,
both returned from Australia, received four of ﬁve cabinet posts awarded to
Timorese by UNTAET in July 2000. Only one post went to someone – Father
Filomeno Jacob of the Catholic Church – who had spent the war inside Timor.
From his position as holder of the Economic Aﬀairs portfolio in UNTAET’s
ﬁrst Timorese cabinet, Alkatiri was able to secure the Fretilin nomination to the
prime ministerial candidacy in the 2001 elections. As Prime Minister, he appointed
Ana Pessoa as Justice Minister, and another returnee, Claudio Ximenes, who held
Portuguese citizenship, as President of the Supreme Court. Other returnees
appointed to key positions in the post-independence government included defence
minister Roque Rodriguez, interior minister Rogerio Lobato, and ﬁnance minister
Madalena Boavida. These individuals were part of the so-called ‘Maputo Maﬁa’
having spent the war in Mozambique. Ramos-Horta, who had returned from
Australia, retained the Foreign Ministry portfolio, although he did not join
Fretilin; Jose Texeira, also returned from Australia, did join Fretilin and was
awarded the natural resources portfolio.
As these individuals were soon to discover, returnees from exile, particularly
those who have been educated in the West, or who have been successful in business
or professional life there, frequently ﬁnd themselves in an ambiguous position in
post-conﬂict politics. They are regarded by international agencies as ideal
interlocutors in reconstruction activities; they speak both Western and local
languages, and understand both Western and local approaches to getting things
done. As such they seem to bridge the divide between the legitimacy of the local
and the capacity of the international. However, from a local perspective, this is
often viewed diﬀerently – legitimacy does not arise from mere ethnic aﬃliation, but
in post-conﬂict contexts – certainly in Cambodia and East Timor – arises from
one’s role in the historic struggle. Those who have spent the war years in comfort
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nature of local sacriﬁces.
The origins of these post-independence leaders in exile was a point of debate
under UNTAET. Following the swearing in of his cabinet in 2000, Special
Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello was asked by an interviewer on Radio
UNTAET whether Ana Pessoa’s appointment to the legal aﬀairs portfolio was
appropriate, given that she had lived in Mozambique for 20 years and was still
there at the time. De Mello replied: ‘The fact that she has lived abroad does not
mean she is incompetent to exercise functions inside East Timor in our Cabinet.
She is a highly respected professional lawyer.’
De Mello went on:
The broader question is: are we not giving a preferential treatment to the diaspora; to the
Portuguese-speaking East Timorese? The answer is no. The answer is there should be no
such distinction; there should be no such hierarchy of merit. I have told the new
generation. those who have remained in East Timor that their own merits will be
recognized; they will be represented in positions of deputy cabinet members, that one would
expect of the younger generation, as well as in other positions of the executive and
deﬁnitely in the National Council.
44
However, De Mello’s own justiﬁcation for the appointment of Ana Pessoa to the
powerful internal administration portfolio – that she was a well-respected
professional lawyer – did de facto privilege not only the older generation but the
also returning exiles, in the same manner as the meritocratic basis of the Return
of Qualiﬁed Exiles programme in Afghanistan did. Timorese had not been allowed
to hold senior public service or professional positions under the Indonesians.
Furthermore, de Mello’s comment implies that ‘merit’ is to be judged entirely
in terms of Western ideas of ‘professionalism’ and not at all in terms of local
knowledge. The distinction between Western and local knowledges became tied to
the question of language in the Timorese case: the older elite returning from exile
communicated mainly in Portuguese, a language that few people had ever been
able to speak in East Timor. The younger generation who had lived through the
war had been educated in Indonesian, and the expansion of education in East
Timor during the occupation meant that this language was quite widely spoken by
the time independence was restored. The return to the use of Portuguese in
government and the legal system was seen as excluding the new middle class in
favour of the small elite that had emerged under colonialism.
The discounting of local knowledge in this way was reﬂected also by the attitude
of UNTAET to local chiefs throughout Timor in the early days following the
withdrawal of the Indonesians: local authority structures set up in the village by
the Clandestine Movement in the aftermath of the Indonesian withdrawal were
largely ignored by UNTAET, which instead promoted a highly centralised
approach to governance that focused upon formalising the position of a Western-
inﬂuenced elite.
Ultimately, however, the lack of local knowledge paralysed the ﬁrst post-
independence government in Timor. East Timor had changed radically during the
war years, to the extent that the clandestine movement and the External Delegation
44 SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello’s press brieﬁng on Sat 15 July 2000 at the swearing-in of East Timor’s
Transitional Cabinet, available at: {http://www.etan.org/et2000c/july/16–22/15srsg.htm}.
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spoke, their attitude to religion, the political networks they participated in, and the
fundamental tenets of the identity they proclaimed to be Timorese. Thus one
interviewee in Dili in 2005 commented:
Our Prime Minister was living in Mozambique during the war, then he came back here, but
he doesn’t really know the situation here. The Church, youth organisations, veterans –
there are a lot of activities that he doesn’t understand.
45
The External Delegation emerged from the tiny Portuguese-speaking, mestizo elite
that existed in Dili in 1974; they held professional positions in countries such as
Australia, Portugal and Mozambique during the war. The student wing of the
Clandestine Movement that had emerged in Dili, by contrast, represented a
broader, Bahasa-speaking generation schooled in Catholicism and Indonesian
nationalism, as well as in law. While neither their Indonesian education nor their
Catholic beliefs can properly be termed ‘indigenous’, they came to represent a form
of local knowledge that was being marginalised, belittled and challenged by the
return of the Fretilin diaspora, and their apparently privileged treatment by the
UN Secretary General. The signiﬁcance of this was pointed out by the president
of the Timorese Bar Association in an interview in 2005:
Most Timorese educated people were educated in the Indonesian time – almost 100 per
cent. From the Portuguese time you can count on your ﬁngers the number of people
educated. Not more than 200 went through university. But mostly we were educated by the
Indonesians. From our generation, we fought against Indonesia, but we were educated by
the Indonesians. We had our eyes opened because they sent us to school. That’s how we
won independence.
46
For this interviewee, Indonesian education is the key to victory in the independence
struggle, and therefore deserving of respect as an indigenous knowledge, something
that the returnees denied. The respective ‘capacities’ of the Portuguese-educated
elite and the Indonesian-educated strata became a signiﬁcant bone of contention in
the post-independence period. The Prime Minister made the infamous comment in
a public speech that holders of Indonesian qualiﬁcations were ‘sarjana supermi
[instant noodles]’ degree holders – holders of degrees that were cheap, poor quality
and quickly cooked up. Graduates of Indonesian universities, in consequence, were
quick to see political intrigue behind every attempt at training that was oﬀered to
them, and the decision to send all judges and prosecutors, on reduced salaries, back
to college, was viewed in this light: ‘Since independence, we have been marginal-
ised. They say we are not qualiﬁed because we graduated from Indonesia.’
47 The
fact that international training for lawyers in the post-independence period was
delivered in Portuguese, a language the judges and prosecutors did not speak, was
a particular irritant, and the ban on the use of Indonesian, the language in which
the judges and prosecutors had received their legal training, in written exams was
regarded by the judges and prosecutors themselves as the key reason why they had
failed the evaluation.
45 Lawyer (name withheld for reasons of conﬁdentiality), interview with the author, Dili (28 May 2005).
46 Mr Benevenides Barros, president, Bar Association of Timor-Leste, interview with the author, Dili
(15 April 2005).
47 Lawyer (name withheld for reasons of conﬁdentiality), interview with the author, Dili (27 May 2005).
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midst of these events, when he argued that the elite returnees from the diaspora
sought to re-establish hierarchies of power and status linked to Portuguese
colonialism, as a means of consolidating their own power and fending oﬀ
challenges from a newly educated middle class. He commented that the employ-
ment of Portuguese-speaking judges from abroad to replace Timorese was a means
of re-establishing a politics of contempt for Timorese backwardness, which had
been marked since the Portuguese colonial practice of dividing the population into
civilised and uncivilised: ‘Portuguese ideology says their colonies are idiots and
stupid – no one is considered smart. So we are also considered stupid.’
48
A major problem for post-independence East Timor was that the centrality of
‘capacity’ to ideas of legitimacy in a country in which various elite groups, with a
powerful sense of their own contribution to the historic struggle, but with fairly
shallow links to any really existing domestic constituency, jostled for power. The
emphasis on ‘capacity’ as a prerequisite for political participation by UNTAET
promoted this tendency. As a result, claims as to what kinds of ‘capacity’ might be
needed or desired were highly politically motivated, and often developed without
reference at all to perceptions of needs on the ground. This produced a post-conﬂict
government that was elite-based, obsessed with the reﬁnement of hierarchies of
status and power, and concerned above all to demobilise and subordinate a
population that regarded itself as a ‘nation of heroes’. The result was catastrophic
for institutionalisation in East Timor in the early years following independence.
In Cambodia, the highly politicised and clientelist state long proved frustrat-
ingly impervious to capacity-building eﬀorts, prompting increasing amounts of
money to be thrown at the issue until, according to a 2007 aid eﬀectiveness review,
the proportion of aid spent on technical assistance, as opposed to investment,
reached almost 50 per cent. This compared to an average of 20 per cent among
other least developed countries in the region, and, unlike other countries in the
region, appeared to be increasing rather than declining.
49 The question of the
actual capacity of Cambodia’s state institutions are addressed in the concluding
section of this article: but the persistence of high levels of technical cooperation
assistance to Cambodia reﬂect the perception among donors that governance in
Cambodia is poor and that therefore more capacity-building is needed.
In the arena of ‘civil society’, international organisations found a willing cohort
of would-be trainees ready to both have their own capacities built and in turn build
the capacities of others. Civil associations had not existed independent of the state
in pre-UNTAC Cambodia, and one of UNTAC’s ‘peacebuilding’ tasks was to
promote a civil society that could, in particular, help UNTAC with the job of
promoting human rights in Cambodia. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s
implementation plan for UNTAC interpreted UNTAC’s human rights role as
including a mandate to ‘encourage the establishment of indigenous human rights
associations’ and involve them in the business of investigating and monitoring
48 Lawyer (name withheld for reasons of conﬁdentiality), interview with the author, Dili (16 June 2005).
49 Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Cambodian Development Council.
Cambodia Aid Eﬀectiveness Report 2007 (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2007),
p. 22.
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50 Under the auspices of UNTAC and subsequent inter-
national donors, around 3000 NGOs have appeared in Cambodia over the last
twenty years.
However, a succession of analyses of Cambodia’s civil society have been
disparaging regarding the ability of these organisations to represent or empower the
poor. The intensive capacity-building resources received by these organisations have
to a great extent become their raison d’etre. Cambodian NGOs spend an inordinate
amount of time building their own capacities – in areas such as book-keeping,
English, computer skills and organisational development – and a rather small
amount of time actually engaging in political activities on behalf of the poor.
It is interesting to note also that many of these organisations were set up and
continue to be run by returnees from the Cambodian diaspora, who had lived
outside Cambodia during the years of warfare and upheaval and returned in the
1990s to make a contribution to their homeland, having been successful in business
or professional life elsewhere. While some of these organisations were and remain
committed to promoting the quality of life for Cambodians, many more emerged
on the basis of rationales comprising a jumble of pop-development buzzwords. On
this basis, they recruited other members of the diaspora or new graduates in
Phnom Penh to work for them; and embarked on programmes of ‘organisational
strengthening’ and ‘professional development’ which were both funded by inter-
national donors and oriented towards the gaining of further international funds.
‘Civil society’ in Cambodia provided an educated class of urban professionals who
lacked a role in the post-war political compact an opportunity to claim a
contribution for themselves that was almost entirely based upon preferential access
to Western knowledges such as ‘human rights’ and ‘eﬀective service-delivery’.
That this occurred is not a testament to the lengths to which Cambodians will
go to exploit foreign aid donors. Rather, it suggests the exclusionary nature of the
‘capacity-building’ discourse as it is transposed into local political language. To
‘have capacity’ is to have access to another world of wealth and resources, on the
grounds of one’s ‘professionalism’; to ‘lack capacity’ is to be distrusted and
marginalised from any legitimate contribution. For Timorese lawyers and judges,
with a formal role in the state system, the question was whether they would be
forced to undergo a humiliating re-evaluation of their status. For Cambodian
returnees entering civil society, with few alternatives given the highly politicised
nature of the state apparatus and the lack of private sector opportunities,
subordination to the demands of Western capacity was the price for return at all.
The level of threat and uncertainty surrounding NGO work in the early 1990s
entailed that these returnees were glad of external support and protection; and
since familiarity with the language of ‘capacity’ quickly became the central metric
by which hierarchies were established and resources doled out, it is unsurprising
that ‘capacity’ became a highly prized and aggressively pursued commodity for it’s
own sake: a means of signalling one’s status rather than simply the competency
with which one does one’s job.
Ultimately, for international donors, the outcome has been frustration and
withdrawal. On the one hand, donors cannot dispense with the rhetoric of
50 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia Containing his Proposed
Implementation Plan for UNTAC including Adminstrative and Financial Aspects’, UN Document
2/23613, 19 February 1992, §9.
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projects that international donors regard as appropriate. Thus, the workshops in
programme planning, log frame construction and transnational networking con-
tinue to take up large chunks of professional NGO workers’ time. On the other
hand, donors periodically release frustrated reports showing how Cambodian
NGOs fail to engage with their target beneﬁciaries, fail to develop internally
democratic structures, and fail to act as a conduit for concerns rising up from the
grassroots. Within the Cambodian NGO sector, the embrace of Western profes-
sionalism, by returnees or the urban educated classes, has far outstripped the
acquisition of local knowledge. One analyst described Cambodian civil society in
2004 as ‘civil society without citizens’.
51
Similarly, an evaluation of ‘civil society’ in Cambodia by the World Bank and
the Centre for Advanced Study in Phnom Penh argued NGOs’ ‘disconnect from
the masses and inability to demonstrate popular support undermines NGOs’
credibility and inﬂuence and has caused government oﬃcials to question their
legitimacy and representativity’. Donor orientation, the report concluded, encour-
aged a clustering of NGOs around Phnom Penh rather than in rural areas. The
report argued, ‘NGOs currently have strong incentives to cater to donors’ program-
matic priorities and reporting requirements and weak incentives to respond and
account to grassroots constituencies.’ Furthermore, the authors contended, ‘NGOs’
dependence on external donor funds also makes their ﬁnancial sustainability
uncertain and creates challenges in terms of reconciling foreign concepts and
agendas with local (cultural, political and social) realities.’
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For returnees in Cambodia’s civil society sector, the outcome of their eﬀorts
was a movement that had remained closely aligned with Western knowledges but
whose transformative impact on the local context was limited. Civil society leaders
retained closer links with Western backers than with local beneﬁciaries; the
organisations they established were to a great extent a refuge for educated young
people who either could not or would not join the capacious state apparatus. As
such, while NGOs achieved signiﬁcant improvements in their own ‘capacities’,
through regular attendance at trainings both in Cambodia and abroad, they had
little success in contributing to anyone else’s, either in the progressive manner
envisaged by Eade, or in the ideological mode envisaged by the World Bank
commissioners of the 2008 assessment, and critiqued by Hameiri.
Contesting Western knowledge with a politics of authenticity
In both cases, these ideas of ‘capacity’ were highly contested. In both Cambodia and
East Timor, the claim that access to Western forms of professional knowledge
should award a privileged role in reconstruction was hotly disputed by contending
elites. In Cambodia, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which has ruled the
country largely undisturbed since 1979 when its leaders overthrew the Khmer Rouge
51 Kheang Un, Democratization without Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia, 1993–2004, PhD thesis,
Northern Illinois University (2004), p. 272.
52 World Bank and Centre for Advanced Study, Linking Citizens and the State: an Assessment of Civil
Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: World Bank, 2008), p. 2.
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this. Initially the CPP focused its attention on the ranks of aspiring politicians who
returned from the diaspora in the 1990s, both as part of the initially successful
royalist movement and in the context of a variety of small parties. The CPP robustly
contested the claims of returnees that they could bring in not only Western
knowledge but also Western aid, investment and, ultimately, Western lifestyles. It
did so by appropriating an assertive discourse of authenticity that emphasised the
CPP’s liberation of Cambodia from the Pol Pot regime and which ridiculed the dual
citizenship and propensity to run away of opposition politicians holding second
passports. CPP leader Hun Sen explicitly challenged the ‘Khmerness’ of the
returnees in this context, memorably declaiming in one major speech,
If we want to take responsibility for the nation’s fate, we must be responsible before the
people [...] We must dare to take responsibility, to live and die with the people. Don’t say
you are Khmer when it is easy and American when it is diﬃcult.
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Similarly, NGOs have been depicted in cartoons in pro-government newspapers in
the most derogatory terms, as a pack of dogs snapping for money thrown to them
by American donors. In 2008, the government announced that it is drafting an
NGO Law that will not only regulate Cambodian NGO activities but will force
NGOs to reveal their funding relationships with donors. This attack from the
standpoint of ‘authenticity’ is designed, like contending claims about ‘capacity’, to
divide, privilege and exclude, rather than articulating any objective reality or
inherent legitimacy on the part of the claimant.
More signiﬁcantly, the Cambodian People’s Party has launched its own political
campaign which roots its claim to legitimacy in its ability to ‘get things done’
without the overt backing or training of international donors. The ability of the
CPP to pass oﬀ many foreign-donated infrastructure projects as its own; and its
further capacity to mobilise vast funds of money for providing development
projects such as schools and temples, has been a vote-winner, and has allowed the
party to claim eﬀectiveness on the basis of supposedly authentic Khmer values such
as gift exchange and solidarity. This has proved highly popular with the voters in
successive elections, particularly during the economic boom from 2001 to 2008, in
part because the CPP, with its impressive network of party cadres at district and
commune level in every part of Cambodia, indeed has more capacity to get things
done than donors, opposition parties, or NGOs. A recent analysis of the CPP’s
handling of funds for party ﬁnanced development activities has shown that a
system which combines rigorous codes of obligation and clear lines of account-
ability with indigenous values of loyalty, exchange, ‘face’ and status operates highly
eﬀectively in a state that, when handling donor’s money, is regarded as one of the
most corrupt in the world.
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In Timor-Leste, lawyers were unable to successfully defend their Indonesian law
degrees, but another contender, the Catholic Church, successfully combated the
agenda of the Fretilin government on grounds of authenticity. The Church
53 Extract from a speech made by Hun Sen at a medical training school, Phnom Penh (27 April 1996),
quoted in ‘Hun Sen: Live and Die with the People’, Phnom Penh Post (3–16 May 1996), p. 3.
54 David Craig and Pak Kimchoeun, ‘Party Financing of Local Investment Projects: Elite and Mass
Patronage’, in Caroline Hughes and Kheang Un, Cambodia’s Economic Transformation,a sy e t
unpublished manuscript (2009), pp. 244–71.
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education policy in early 2005, which signiﬁcantly drained the legitimacy of the
Alkatiri government. Fretilin had mooted the idea that in the new state school
educational curriculum, religious education should be made optional in line with
the commitment to secular education in the Constitution. This was anathema to
the Church, which demanded a central role for catechism in public schools.
The dispute demonstrated the shifting status of the Church over the period of
the Indonesian Occupation. While in 1974, the Church was the province of the
colonial elite, with only 20 per cent of the Timorese population was characterised
as Catholic, the Indonesian policy of registering everyone with a major world
religion entailed that the proportion of the population deﬁning themselves as
Catholic rose to 90 per cent. At the same time, under Indonesian rule, the Timorese
Church continued to be administered from the Vatican separately from the
Indonesian Catholic Church, and permission was given for services to be held in
the local lingua franca, Tetum, rather than Portuguese. By these means, and by the
role that Timorese priests played in the resistance struggle, the Church became
indigenised, such that Fretilin’s progressive secular policies, which would have been
barely contested in the early 1970s, were an explosive issue in the 1990s, seen as
demonstrating the lack of understanding, on the part of the Fretilin leaders, of how
Timorese identity had evolved during the war.
The following year, violence erupted in Dili over tensions between soldiers from
the western and eastern districts of Timor-Leste, with westerners claiming
discrimination against them by the eastern commanders. Discontent with the slow
pace of development, and claims that leaders were siphoning money to the east
reawakened ancient regional divisions which had been largely dormant during the
period of national liberation struggle. The Timorese case demonstrates the ways in
which the nature of the ‘authentic’ and of divisions within society transform
rapidly in situations of conﬂict and poverty; the resignation of Alkatiri from
government in the face of this opposition indicates the highly politicised nature of
struggles over local knowledge in the face of international capacity building eﬀorts
involving returnees.
Conclusion
This analysis of capacity assessment and capacity-building is signiﬁcant, because of
the broader signiﬁcance of claims of authenticity and cosmopolitanism to politics
in post-conﬂict countries, and the ways in which these aﬀect the ability of elites to
foster links with the population that can shore up newly established institutions. In
states facing a large inﬂux of international aid, facility in Western knowledges
represents a signiﬁcant political resource, as well as a potentially important
resource for ﬁnding practical solutions to problems. Yet it is also exclusionary and
to that it extent it is contested by equally divisive and interested counter-claims of
‘authenticity’ that can used to challenge or deny casual assumptions of ethnic
fraternity. The problem with capacity building is not that language diﬃculties or
cultural sensitivities preclude foreigners from eﬀectively transferring technical
knowledge to locals; but that the prioritisation of international knowledge over
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process, which requires the application of particular types of power and the
mobilisation of particular types of alliance if it is to succeed. Indeed, investment in
cosmopolitanism can come at the expense of investment in political links at home,
and it is these links of solidarity, loyalty and obligation that ultimately award
political power, as the Cambodian People’s Party has so eﬀectively shown in
Cambodia, and Fretilin demonstrated by its failure in Timor-Leste. These links are
not awarded merely by asserting a common ethnic identity. Rather they emerge
from participation over time in political activities that are, at least to some extent,
informed by an account of human need that accords with lived experience on the
ground. This is an area in which local knowledge clearly has the edge, in that it
tends to come with local networks and alliances that can be used to mobilise
popular support. Harnessing this kind of local knowledge to development agendas
represents the key task for development agencies seeking to eﬀect change in
post-conﬂict states.
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